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INTRODUCTION

In 1974, Congress passed the Health Care Institution Amendments
(Health Care Amendments)' to the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA). u The Health Care Amendments guarantee unions the right to
organize nonprofit health care institutions, a right previously allowed only
in profit-managed health care facilities meeting the jurisdictional standards of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).3 Organizational
rights are therefore presently assured by the NLRB in both nonprofit and
profit hospitals.4 Because of the unique need to provide high quality patient care within a tranquil setting, the right to organize has caused endless
controversy over where such organizational efforts should be allowed.5 Solicitation, or attempts by pro-union employees to organize a particular
union through distribution of literature, leaflets, or through other persuasive means, has traditionally been forbidden by hospitals enacting no-solicitation rules.6 The fundamental issue, as noted by Chief Justice Burger,
1. See Health Care Institution Amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 152, 158, 183 (1976); id § 169 (1976 & Supp. V)) [hereinafter cited
as Health Care Amendments]. The Health Care Amendments define a health care institution as: "any hospital, convalescent hospital, health maintenance organization, health clinic,
nursing home, extended care facility, or other institution devoted to the care of sick, infirm,
or aged person." Health Care Amendments, 29 U.S.C. § 152(14)(1976).
2. See National Labor Relations (NLRA) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976)). The two major amendments to the NLRA were the
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73
Stat. 519 (1959) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976). Originally, the NLRA made
no mention of private, nonprofit hospitals. These hospitals were first expressly exempted
from NLRA coverage by the Taft-Hartley Act. The current version of the Taft-Hartley Act
is present at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-167 (1976). For a background discussion of the LandrumGriffin amendments, see generally Cox, The Landrum-Griflin Amendments to the National
Labor RelationsAct, 44 MINN. L. REV. 257, 257-60 (1959).
3. See Butte Medical Props., 168 N.L.R.B. 266, 268 (1967) (policies of NLRA effectuated in assuming jurisdiction over proprietary hospitals whose gross revenues exceed
$250,000); University Nursing Home, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 263, 264 (1967) (proprietary nursing homes with revenues over $100,000 proper subject for NLRA jurisdiction). In 1970, the
NLRB assumed authority over nonprofit nursing homes even though health care was only a
secondary function to the primary purpose of providing a social custodial facility for elderly
adults. See Drexel Homes, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 1045, 1046-47 (1970).
4. See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1976). The NLRB has the statutory right, however, to decline
jurisdiction where there is only a minimal effect on interstate commerce. See id § 164(c)(1).
5. See St. John's Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1368, 1374 (10th
Cir. 1977) (clear congressional interest expressed as to where solicitation should be allowed).
6. See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 179-81 (1976) (overview of employee's rights to solicit). This comment

will use solicitation and distribution synonymously since distribution of materials is usually
a form of solicitation. See St. John's Hosp. & School of Nursing v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1368,
1376 (10th Cir. 1977) (restrictions on solicitation same as on distribution). But see Farah
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is "whether the employees' organizational rights affected by the hospital
rules in question are superior to the hospital's needs in carrying out its
mission."7 By employing a balancing approach between these two dissimilar interests, the NLRB and the federal courts have developed a set of
presumptions to determine whether a no-solicitation rule is valid.'
The first objective of this comment is to examine the development of
these presumptions since 1974 by analyzing case law specifically relating to
working areas and working hours within the health care environment. The
ultimate purpose, however, is to provide concrete guidelines for the practitioner, representing either union or management, who wishes to secure
safe ground for his or her client regarding permissible solicitation areas.
II.

HISTORY OF THE

NLRB's PRESUMPTIONS REGARDING NoSOLICITATION RULES

A. NationalLabor RelationsAct and the Health Care Amendments
Section 7 of the NLRA, as amended, states that "[e]mployees shall have
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
Mfg. Co., 187 N.L.R.B. 601, 601 (1970) (wider latitude given by NLRB regarding solicitation as opposed to distribution of literature), enforcedper curiam, 450 F.2d 942 (5th Cir.
1971). An example of a typically invalid no-solicitation rule reads as follows:
No solicitations of any kind, including solicitations for memberships or subscriptions,
will be permitted by employees at any time, including work time and non-work time in
any area of the Hospital which is accessible to or utilized by the public. Anyone who
does so will be subject to disciplinary action. In those work areas of the Hospital not
accessible to or utilized by the public, no solicitations of any kind, including solicitations for memberships or subscriptions will be permitted at any time by employees who
are supposed to be working, or in such a way as to interfere with the work of other
employees who are supposed to be working. Anyone who does so and thereby neglects
his work or interferes with the work of others will likewise be subject to disciplinary
action.
No distributions of any kind, including circulars or other printed materials, shall be
permitted in any work area at any time.
NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 776 n.2 (1979).
7. NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 793 (1979) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
The Chief Justice would accord much greater weight to the patient's well-being than is currently recognized by the United States Supreme Court. See id at 791. Compare Beth Israel
Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 501-02 (1978) (majority decision rests on statistical evidence
regarding frequency of patient use) with NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 791
(1979) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (no evidence necessary to prove importance of patient
care).

8. See St. John's Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1368, 1374 (10th Cir. 1977) (needs of
hospital patients accorded considerable weight in balancing rights of patients and employees). A discussion of the NLRB presumptions regarding no-solicitation rules is addressed in
Part II of this comment.
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engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining...
and shall also have the right to refrain from any . . . such activities
..

. "' Specifically, the NLRA prevents employers from interfering with

employees' rights to organize and to bargain collectively with their employer.1" Additionally, the NLRA authorizes the formation of the National Labor Relations Board, which is an administrative agency
empowered to investigate and, if necessary, prosecute unfair labor practices, as well as to conduct representation elections.'" Congress intended
the NLRB to have the authority to create and develop fundamental national labor policy. 1 2 Enforcement of the NLRB's orders is accomplished
when the General Counsel of the NLRB successfully petitions a federal
NLRA, to
circuit court, possessing statutory
3 jurisdictional power under the
order.'
the
aside
set
or
enforce
The NLRB originally lacked jurisdiction over the nonprofit health care
industry,' 4 which by the early 1970's constituted over 50% of all hospital
employees.'" In 1974, Congress passed the Health Care Amendments partially because of the substantial impact of the health care industry on interstate commerce, a factor not originally present when these nonprofit

9. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
10. See id § 158(a)(l). This section states that "[Ilt shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer ... to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157." Id § 158(a)(l).
II. See id § 153(a), (b), (d). The NLRB was initially comprised of three Board members who were appointed by the President. In 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act expanded the
number of Board members to five. See Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1976). See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 7 (1976) (general explanation of functions performed by NLRB Members). The
Supreme Court has ruled repeatedly that the NLRB has express congressional authority to
create and interpret national labor policy. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 498, 501
(1978) (congressional delegation of NLRA's interpretation to NLRB) (quoting from NLRB
v. Truck Drivers Local 449, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957)
(national labor policy under jurisdiction of NLRB subject to narrow judicial review)); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 797-98 (1945) (NLRB to apply language of
NLRA).
12. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 501 (1978) (congressional intent
grants NLRB power to decide labor policy).
13. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f) (1976).
14. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970).
Drafters of the Taft-Hartley Act expressly amended section 2(2) of the Act to define the term
"employer" so as to exclude "any corporation or association operating a hospital, if no part
of the net earnings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual." Id § 152.
There was one reported case before Taft-Hartley which upheld the Act's coverage of nonprofit hospitals. See Central Dispensary & Emergency Hosp., 145 F.2d 852, 853 (D.C. Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 847 (1945).
15. See S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3946, 3948.
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hospitals were exempted from coverage by the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947.16
The authors of the amendments were primarily concerned, however, with
the numerous work stoppages which were disrupting the entire health care
system. In discussing the bill, the legislative proponents agreed "that the
needs of patients in health care institutions required special consideration" ' 7 and further "recognized [the] concern for the need to avoid disruption of patient care wherever possible.""8 Specifically, subsection (a) of the
final bill repealed the exemption for nonprofit hospitals while subsection
(b) expansively defined health care institutions to include: "hospital, convalescent hospital, health maintenance organization, health clinic, nursing
home, extended care facility, or other institution devoted to the care of
sick, infirm, or aged persons."' 9 In effect, then, the Health Care Amendments were designed to reduce the number of strikes by providing organizational and collective bargaining rights under the aegis of the NLRA
while simultaneously recognizing the delicate nature of the health care
situation.2 °
B.

The NLRB's Presumptionsin the IndustrialArea

Following the enactment of the NLRA, industrial and commercial employers attempted to utilize no-solicitation rules partly to enforce discipline and partly to stave off organizational attempts. 2 ' Some of these rules

16. See 120 CONG. REC. 16899-900 (1974) (statements of Rep. Ashbrook, co-sponsor of

Health Care Amendments bill; nonprofit hospitals originally community charitable
institutions).
17. S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3946, 3948.

18. Id, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3946, 3948, 3951. For an
exhaustive discussion of the legislative history of the Health Care Amendments, see generally Feheley, Amendments to the NationalLabor RelationsAct." Health Care Institutions, 36
OHIO ST. L.J. 235, 241-47 (1975) (reasoning for congressional approval of amendments explained). See generally Vernon, Labor Relations in the Health Care Field Under the 1974
Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act. An Overview and Analysis, 70 Nw. U.L.
REV. 202, 203-07 (1975) (discussion of amendments and Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service involvement).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1976).
20. See generally Feheley, Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act." Health
CareInstitutions, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 235, 240 (1975) (amendments designed to lessen recognition strikes). Moreover, one proponent of the bill, Senator Dominick, in relating a New
York Times story about striking hospital workers, expressed grave concern over the uniqueness of the health care industry and the resultant scarcity of health care service in rural
areas, especially those areas which could be potentially affected by recognition. strikes. See.
S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974) (citing N.Y. Times, Nov. .8, 1973), reprintedin
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3946, 3953-54.
21. See Florida Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 1225, 1230 (5th Cir. 1976) (explicitly
anti-union no-solicitation rule found invalid). Generally, the Fifth Circuit has ruled in in-
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were so patently discriminatory that the NLRB presumed those rules
facially invalid. 2 This section summarizes those industrial presumptions
and follows with a discussion of the presumptions presently used in the
health care industry.
The NLRB in In re Peyton Packing Co., 23 set out two general industrial
presumptions pertaining to no-solicitation rules enforced by employers:
The [National Labor Relations] Act, of course, does not prevent an
employer from making and enforcing reasonable rules covering the
conduct of employees on company time. Working time is for work. It
is therefore within the province of an employer to promulgate and
enforce a rule prohibiting union solicitation during working hours.
Such a rule must be presumed to be valid in the absence of evidence
that it was adopted for a discriminatory purpose. It is no less true that
time outside working hours, whether before or after work, or during
luncheon or rest periods, is an employee's time to use as he wishes
without unreasonable restraint, although the employee is on company
property. It is therefore not within the province of an employer to
promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting union solicitation by an
employee outside of working hours, although on company property.
Such a rule must be presumedto be an unreasonableimpediment to selforganization and therefore discriminatory in the absence of evidence
that special circumstances make the rule necessary in order to maintain production or discipline.24
Essentially, any rule forbidding solicitation during working time was
presumed enforceable.2 5 The second presumption stated that any rule disallowing solicitation during nonworking hours was invalid absent countervailing factors, such as production or discipline reasons, which may be
necessary to a plant's safe and efficient operation.26
In Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, z7 the Supreme Court upheld the

dustrial cases that allowing soliciting in non-working areas during non-working times is
protected under the NLRA, when production or discipline is not adversely effected. Cf
Custom Recovery, Div. of Keystone Resources, Inc. v. NLRB, 597 F.2d 1041, 1044 (5th Cir.
1979) (employer's verbal no-solicitation rule valid in light of employer's interest in maintaining production during working hours).
22. See NLRB v. Mangurian's, Inc., 566 F.2d 463, 465 (5th Cir. 1978); Florida Steel
Corp. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 1225, 1230 (5th Cir. 1976); see also NLRB v. Computed Time
Corp., 587 F.2d 790, 793 (5th Cir. 1979) (company rule prohibiting soliciting employees for
"organization" membership invalidated).
23. 49 N.L.R.B. 828 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1944).
24. Id at 843-44 (emphasis added).
25. See id at 843.
26. See id at 843-44.
27. 324 U.S. 793 (1945). A companion case from the Fifth Circuit, LeTourneau Co. of
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NLRB's decision in In re Peyton Packing Co. by observing: "We perceive
no error in the Board's adoption of this presumption [referring to the presumptions in Peyton Packing Co.].

.

. .[T]he validity.

. .

depends upon

the rationality of what is proved and what is inferred. 28
These two presumptions represent the starting point in any analysis of
industrial, commercial, or health care solicitation rules. The delicate nature of the hospital environment necessitates "a more finely calibrated
scale" when balancing employees' organizational rights against patients'
interests in noncontroversial surroundings.29
C.

The NLRB's Presumptionsin the Health Care Field

Until the passage of the Health Care Amendments in 1974, nonprofit
hospital employers were not subject to the NLRB's jurisdiction and therefore had free reign in constructing rules prohibiting union solicitation on
company property.3" Since 1974, however, the NLRB's industrial presumptions have been generally held to apply to the health care field where
they involve two related concepts: working hours and working areas, including both immediate and patient-access care areas. 3 For example, a
Georgia v. NLRB, 143 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1944), rev'd sub nom. Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945), was decided along with Republic Aviation. In LeTourneau, employees were suspended two days for passing out union literature in violation of the company's no-solicitation rule. See LeTourneau Co. of Georgia v. NLRB, 143 F.2d 67, 68 (5th
Cir. 1944), rev'd sub nom. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
28. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 804-05 (1945). In Republic Aviation, a large military aircraft manufacturer promulgated a simple rule stating: " '[sloliciting
of any type cannot be permitted in the factory or offices.' " Id. at 795. Citing In re Peyton
Packing Co., the Supreme Court held this rule violated organizational rights guaranteed by
the NLRA. See id at 795-96, 804-05. The majority opinion in Republic Aviation also stressed
that the NLRB was to establish national labor relations policy by hearing evidence and
making findings of fact. See id at 798-800. The validity of these presumptions depends in
large part on several factors, including production, discipline, or safety. See Eastern Maine
Medical Center v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 1, 4 (Ist Cir. 1981) (restrictions on non-working time
solicitation activity allowed only when production or discipline reasons present); Woodview
Rehabilitation Center, 265 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 5 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 15,580 at 26,608 (Dec.
13, 1982) (absence of safety reasons rendered overly broad no-solicitation rule invalid). See
generally Feheley, Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act.- Health Care Institutions, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 235, 292 (1975) (general discussion of 'special circumstances').
29. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 505 (1978) (judicial notice taken
regarding availability of other solicitation areas). See generaly Gould, The Supreme Court
andLabor Law. The October 1978 Term, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 630-32 (1979) (discussion of
"special circumstances" of hospital setting).
30. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970) (nonprofit health care facilities statutorily excluded
from NLRB coverage). See generally Shanin, NLRB v. BaptistHospital,Inc.. Union Solicitation in Health Care Institutions, 6 AM. J. L. & MED. 105, 109 (1980) (article notes exclusion
of health care institutions before 1974).
31. See NLRB v. Florida Medical Center, Inc., 576 F.2d 666, 670 (5th Cir. 1978) (con-
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no-solicitation rule preventing solicitation in working areas is presumed
valid;3 2 conversely, a no-solicitation rule in nonworking areas, such as employee-only locker rooms, is presumed invalid.3 3 A no-solicitation rule
banning solicitation during nonworking hours would similarly be presumed invalid.34 The Supreme Court, in adopting the NLRB's presumptions, has ruled that a hospital may rebut any presumption of invalidity by
presenting evidence proving that union solicitation in the controversial
area is disruptive to patient care. 3 5 Moreover, the Supreme Court is judicially sensitive to a hospital's primary interest in creating restful surroundings conducive to prompt rehabilitation.36
III.

APPLICATION OF THE NLRB's PRESUMPTIONS TO WORKING AREAS
AND WORKING HOURS IN THE HEALTH CARE FIELD

Following the extension of the NLRA's coverage over nonprofit hospitals, a polarization of opinion regarding proper solicitation areas has developed. Poised at one end are employees who are seeking to exercise their
self-organizational rights in hospital settings as promised under the
NLRA.37 At the opposite end are embattled employers who wish to propany rule prohibiting solicitation during hospital time held invalid). The Supreme Court
addressed permissible solicitation areas in NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773 (1979)
and Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978), discussed fully in Section Il1. A. of this
comment. The NLRB in T.R.W. Bearings Div., Div. of T.R.W., Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 442, 442
(1981), discussed the invalidity of the term working hours, and is the object of inquiry in
Section III.B.
32. Cf. Guyan Valley Hosp., Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. 107, ll (1972) (no-solicitation rule in
working area presumed valid).
33. See NLRB v. Beth Israel Hosp., 554 F.2d 477, 480 (ist Cir. 1977) (no-solicitation
rule invalid in non-working areas), aft'd, 437 U.S. 483 (1978).
34. See id at 478-80 (rule prohibiting solicitation during non-working hours presumed
invalid). See generally St. John's Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1368,
1371 n.4 (10th Cir. 1977) (hospital rule proscribing solicitation during working time upheld);
Food Store Employee Union Local 347 v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1177, 1179-80 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(company rule preventing soliciting during working hours held invalid); Winchester Spinning Corp. v. NLRB, 402 F.2d 299, 303 (4th Cir. 1968) (no-solicitation rule applying to nonworking hours presumptively invalid).
35. See NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 781 n. I1 (1979). See also Beth Israel
Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 507 (1978) (facility must show disruption to patient care).
36. See NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 791 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
37. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). In a Supreme Court case, the majority held that:
[o]rganization rights are not viable in a vacuum; their effectiveness depends in some
measure on the ability of employees to learn the advantages and disadvantages of organization from others. Early in the history of the administration of the Act the Board
recognized the importance of freedom of communication to the free exercise of organization rights.
Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 543 (1972); see also NLRB v. Magnavox Co.,
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vide quiet surroundings for the patient's well-being.38
The NLRB and the courts agree that a total prohibition of solicitation is
unfounded and unacceptable. 39 They also agree that a hospital is a unique
setting and furthermore recognize the hospital's undisputed need to maintain the tranquil atmosphere essential to the hospital's primary function of
providing quality patient care.' The NLRB and the courts thus seek to
balance the rights of both employee and employer. This goal is more easily
acknowledged than implemented. The following section describes the major developments of labor policy regarding NLRB presumptions for the
health care industry since the passage of the Health Care Amendments in
1974.
A,

Working Areas
1. Immediate Patient Care Areas

The first post-Health Care Amendment decision by the NLRB, St.
John's Hospital & School of Nursing, Inc. ,4'ruled that the NLRB's presumption against the validity of an overly broad no-solicitation rule would
apply except to working, immediate patient care areas, including "patients'
rooms, operating rooms, and places where patients receive treatment, such
as x-ray and therapy areas.",42 Thus, the NLRB would presume any nosolicitation rule valid which forbade solicitation in the above-enumerated
areas, even during nonworking hours.4 3
The NLRB reasoned further that solicitation, if permitted in these
places, would be unsettling to patients, thereby distinguishing between
strictly patient care areas and "patient access" areas. 44 On appeal to the
415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974),reh'g denied, 416 U.S. 952 (1974) (Court ruled place of work appro-

priate for dissemination of literature).
38. See Beth Israel Hosp. v.NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 498-99 n.16 (1978); see also St. John's
Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 1150, 1150-51 (1976) (special characteristics

of hospital given additional weight), enforced in part and denied in part, 557 F.2d 1368 (10th
Cir. 1977).
39. See St. John's Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1368. 1371 (10th

Cir. 1977) (special circumstances necessary to prohibit solicitation); cf. NLRB v. Florida
Medical Center, Inc., 576 F.2d 666, 670 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978) (hospital's duty to maintain

patient care given considerable weight).
40. See St. John's Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1368, 1372 (10th

Cir. 1977) (peaceful environment necessary to patients' recovery).
41. 222 N.L.R.B. 1150 (1976), enforced inpart and denied inpart, 557 F.2d 1368 (10th

Cir. 1977).
42. Id at 1150.

43. Seeid at 1150.
44. See id at 1151. The NLRB recognized that a tranquil atmosphere is necessary for
patient care. See id at 1150. Patient access areas were defined to be "cafeterias, lounges, and
the like .
I..."
ld at 1151.
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United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the majority reviewed the balancing approach utilized by the NLRB and concluded that
the NLRB did not give sufficient attention
to the expressed congressional concern for the needs of the Hospital's
patients. Once it is admitted that union solicitation is disruptive of the
tranquil atmosphere . . . and may be unsettling to patients . . . it is
unreasonable to conclude that these adverse effects of union solicitation will occur in some patient access areas but not in others.45
Consequently, the Tenth Circuit extended the definition of immediate patient care espoused by the NLRB to cover all areas to which the patient
had access, including "halls, stairways, elevators, and waiting rooms accessible to patients. 46
The St. John's Hospital decision presented a second pertinent issuewhether "substantial evidence" was presented by the hospital to rebut the
presumption against the validity of its no-solicitation rule.47 The Tenth
Circuit's analysis revealed that a paucity of evidence was submitted by the
hospital to rebut the NLRB's presumption.4 8 Instead, the appeals court,
using alternative reasoning, held that the "special circumstances" of the
health care environment sufficiently rebutted the NLRB's presumption.49
The effect of the Tenth Circuit's decision was to broaden the NLRB's
presumption against solicitation in working areas defined in St. John's
Hospital to include patient access areas often frequented by patients."0
Other circuits have declined to follow the Tenth Circuit's distinction between immediate patient care and patient access areas. The First Circuit,
in Beth IsraelHospital v. NLRB, enforced a NLRB order permitting solici-

45. St. John's Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1368, 1374 (10th Cir.
1977). The Tenth Circuit thus denied enforcement of the NLRB's order regarding solicitation in patient access areas but enforced the NLRB's orders which held that the hospital had
unlawfully interfered with three employees' organizational rights. See id at 1378. Moreover,
the Tenth Circuit, relying heavily on the legislative history behind the passage of the Health
Care Amendments, stated: "There was a recognized concern for the need to avoid disruption
of patient care wherever possible." Id at 1374 (citing S. REP. No. 93-766, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 2, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3946, 3951).
46. See St. John's Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1368, 1375 (10th
Cir. 1977).
47. See id at 1378 (definition of substantial evidence).
48. See id at 1374-75. An additional legal ground relied on by the Tenth Circuit was
that the NLRB wrongly refused to consider the availability of other means of access where
union activities could be permitted. See id.at 1375; see also NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415
U.S. 322, 324 (1974) (special considerations may make no-solicitation rule essential for production or discipline reasons), reh'g denied, 416 U.S. 952 (1974).
49. See St. John's Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1368, 1374-75
(10th Cir. 1977).
50. See id at 1375.
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tation in the cafeteria and coffee shops, but did not base their holding on a
difference between immediate and patient access areas. 5 ' In Lutheran Hospital of Milwaukee, Inc. v. NLRB, the Seventh Circuit, in relying on the
NLRB's expertise in labor policy matters, disagreed with the Tenth Circuit's St. John's Hospital holding and affirmed the NLRB's order allowing
solicitation in cafeterias and lounges. 2 This cacophony of opinions by the
differing circuits was soon to be addressed but not resolved by the
Supreme Court.
2.

Patient Access Areas

Prompted by the incongruous positions taken by the several circuits, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Beth IsraelHospital v. NLRB. " In
this case, the hospital had restricted solicitation to certain employee locker
rooms and restrooms, explicitly forbidding any union activity on hospital
property.5 4 Upon a challenge by employees that this no-solicitation rule
interfered with the employees' organizational rights guaranteed by the
NLRA and the Health Care Amendments, the NLRB presumed the above
rule invalid and ordered the hospital to cease from enforcing it. 55
On appeal from the NLRB, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit affirmed the NLRB's ruling, reasoning that the hospital neglected "to show that special circumstances justified its curtailment of protected activities" in the cafeteria and coffee shop areas, while letting stand
51. See NLRB v. Beth Israel Hosp., 554 F.2d 477, 480-81 (1st Cir. 1977), aft'd, 437 U.S.
483 (1978). In Beth Israel, the First Circuit rejected the "puzzling" distinction between patient care areas and non-patient care areas. See id at 482-83. See generally Note, Beth Israel
Hospital v. NLRB. The No Solicitation-No DistributionRule as Applied to the Private,Nonprofit Hospital, 6 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 609 (1979) (background and analysis of Beth Israel
case).
52. See Lutheran Hosp. of Milwaukee, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 208, 214-16 (7th Cir.
1977), vacated and remanded, 438 U.S. 902 (1978). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit protected solicitation in cafeterias and coffee shops, concluding that patients and
visitors are indifferent to solicitation in areas outside of immediate patient care. See id at
215. The Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the Sixth Circuit have denied
enforcement to similar NLRB orders, orders designed to protect solicitation in corridors and
cafeterias as well as in other patient access areas. See Baylor Univ. Medical Center v.
NLRB, 578 F.2d 351, 353-54 (D.C. Cir. 1978), vacatedin part, remandedin part, 439 U.S. 9
(1978); NLRB v. Baptist Hosp.,Inc., 576 F.2d 107, 110 (6th Cir. 1978).
53. 437 U.S. 483 (1978). See generally Note, Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB." The No
Solicitation-No DistributionRule as Applied to the Private,Nonprofit Hospital, 6 OHIo N.U.L.
REV. 609 (1979) (analysis of Beth Israel and its implications).
54. See Beth Israel Hosp., 223 N.L.R.B. 1193, 1195 (1976). The objectionable rule
stated that in: "[p]atient care ... areas, and areas open to the public such as the lobbies,
cafeteria and coffee shop. . . there is to be no solicitation nor distribution of literature." See
id at 1195.
55. See id at 1199 (1976).
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the hospital's prohibition against solicitation in areas outside the cafeteria
and coffee shop.56 Thus, the burden of proof was on the hospital to show
by substantial evidence57 "special circumstances" as to why solicitation
should not be allowed.
In affirming the First Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court relied on
congressional authority given to the NLRB to balance conflicting legitimate interests of both union and management, noting that there was nothing in the legislative history of the Health Care Amendments to indicate
that the health care field was outside the NLRB's expertise.5" In fact, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed Congress' explicit grant of authority to the
NLRB to formulate national labor policy, adding that although the NLRB
lacks expertise in health-care service delivery, "[T]he Board is [an] expert
in federal national labor relations policy, and it is in the Board. . .that
the 1974 amendments [Health Care Amendments] vested responsibility for
developing that policy in the health care industry."5 9 Finally, the Supreme
Court placed considerable weight, which should be carefully heeded by the
practitioner, on the infrequency of patient visits to the controverted cafeteria and coffee shop areas.6 ° The majority concluded that in the absence of
any hospital evidence showing harmful effects to patients in these areas,
the hospital would have to rescind its no-solicitation rule disallowing solicitation in these areas. 6 Although the Beth Israel Hospital decision could
have been the Supreme Court's instrument for establishing guidelines regarding solicitation in the health care field, the end product of Beth Israel
Hospital merely affirmed the NLRB's presumptions regarding the invalidity of a no-solicitation rule in cafeteria and coffee shop areas. 62 Consequently, solicitation was permitted by the lower courts in cafeterias and
coffee shops, both of which are patient access areas according to NLRB

56. See NLRB v. Beth Israel Hosp., 554 F.2d 477, 480, 482-83 (1st Cir. 1977), a'd,437
U.S. 483 (1978). Without naming such areas, the court advised the NLRB to revise its presumption in future cases where the patients' care was potentially jeopardized. See id.at 481.
57. See id.at 480. The circuit court accorded great emphasis to the hospital's primary
function of providing patient care in finding that the hospital did not meet the heavy burden
by merely positing "speculative" effects of employee activities. See id at 482. Special circumstances were not defined but the First Circuit suggested inferentially that a case-by-case
analysis was essential. See id at 482-83.
58. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 496-97 (1978). The majority opinion
found that Congress was willing to rely on the NLRB to decide policy matters for the health
care industry. See id.at 497.
59. See id at 501.
60. See id.at 502.
61. See id at 507.
62. See id.at 488-89. The Supreme Court in Beth Israel affirmed the NLRB's congressionally-mandated authority to develop fundamental national labor policy. See id.at 500-01.
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definition.63
At the same time the Supreme Court was deciding Beth IsraelHospital,

the NLRB petitioned the Sixth Circuit in NLRB v. Baptist Hospital,Inc., 61
to delineate further the NLRB's presumptions as they applied to patient
access areas, other than cafeterias and coffee shops.6 5 In Baptist Hospital,
the hospital's no-solicitation rule prevented soliciting "at any time

. . .

in

66
any area of the Hospital which is accessible to or utilized by the public."
The NLRB had rejected the hospital's contention that this rule was needed
for patient care, holding the no-solicitation rule invalid in any areas
outside of immediate patient care as enunciated in St. John's Hospital.6 7
Relying on legislative history behind the Health Care Amendments, the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied, in part, enforcement of the
NLRB's order. 6' The Sixth Circuit held that the hospital presented sufficient evidence justifying its no-solicitation rule.69
On granting certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's
opinion in part and vacated and remanded it in part.7 ° Specifically, the
Court affirmed the NLRB's presumption against solicitation in immediate
patient care areas defined in St. John's Hospital, and reversed the Sixth
Circuit's ruling that sufficient evidence was presented to prohibit solicitation in the cafeteria, gift shops, or first floor lobbies. 7' Influenced by the

63. See Baylor Univ. Medical Center v. NLRB, 593 F.2d 1290, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(court remanded case to Board for reconsideration in light of Beth Israel), vacated in part,
remanded inpart, 439 U.S. 9 (1978); NLRB v. St. Joseph Hosp., 587 F.2d 1060, 1064-65
(10th Cir. 1978), enforcing in part and remanding in part, 228 N.L.R.B. 158 (1977). But see
Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 509 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (patientoriented cafeteria could justify no-solicitation rule).
64. 442 U.S. 773 (1979).
65. See NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 576 F.2d 107, 110 (6th Cir. 1978) (court allowed
ban on solicitation in gift shop and lobbies), atd inpart, vacated and remanded in part, 442
U.S. 773 (1979). For a general discussion of the Baptist Hospital decision, see Note, Presumption Against Rules Prohibiting Solicitation During Non working Time-NLRB's Application of
Presumption in Hospital Patient Access Areas, Exceptfor Immediate Patient Care Areas, Upheld as Valid NLRB v.Baptist Hospital, Inc., 25 VILL. L. REV. 583 (1980).
66. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 344, 348 (1976), enforcement denied in part, remanded inpart, 576 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1976), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 442
U.S. 773 (1979).
67. See id at 344 n.2, 346; see also St. John's Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc., 222
N.L.R.B. 1150, 1150 (1976), enforced, St. John's Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc. v. NLRB,
557 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1977) (immediate patient care areas include patients' rooms, operating rooms, and treatment rooms).
68. See NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 576 F.2d 107, 110 (6th Cir. 1978), aft'd in part,
vacated and remanded in part, 442 U.S. 773 (1979).
69. Seeid at 109-110.
70. See NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 777 (1979).
71. See id at 786-87. The Court reviewed the evidence and concluded that only an
occasional use by patients who were judged fit to visit such areas was not sufficient to pro-
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congressional admonition that a hospital should provide an undisturbed
patient care setting, the Supreme Court held that the hospital had
presented sufficient evidence to rebut the NLRB's presumption against the
validity of a no-solicitation rule in corridors and sitting rooms on patients'
floors. 2 The practical effect of this secondary holding is that a hospital, or
other health care institution as defined by the NLRA, has the burden of
proof to rebut the NLRB's presumptions by presenting evidence that solic73
itation was likely "either to disrupt patient care or disturb patients."
Moreover, although the NLRB's findings are binding on the reviewing
courts, such findings are only binding if they are supported by "substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole."74
Finally, the Supreme Court in Baptist Hospital issued a firm directive to
the NLRB to modify its presumptions regarding health care areas.7 5 In the
past, the Court has granted the NLRB great deference in allowing the
NLRB to develop labor law and its own set of presumptions.7 6 Language
within the Baptist Hospital opinion, however, indicated that the majority
believed it was time for the NLRB to revamp its presumptions in the
health care industry to accomodate more adequately the uniquely sensitive
health care environment.77
The result of the Supreme Court's holdings in Beth IsraelHospital and

hibit solicitation in those areas. See id at 787. See generally Comment, Labor Relations in the
Health Care Industr--The Impact of the 1974 Health CareAmendments to the NationalLabor RelationsAct, 54 TUL. L. REv. 416, 442-43 (1980) (analysis of Baptist Hospital decision).

72. See NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 785-86 (1979). In a strong forewarning to the NLRB to review its presumptions, the Supreme Court added: "It must be said,
however, that the experience to date raises serious doubts as to whether the Board's interpre-

tation of its present presumption adequately takes into account the medical practices...
incident to the delivery of patient-care services in a modern hospital." Id. at 789. In added
footnote language, the majority opinion used the present tense to emphasize the need for
"reviewing" its presumptions. See id at 789 n.16.
73. Id. at 781 n.Il.
74. See id at 782 (quoting 29 U.S.C. 160(e) (1976)); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373

U.S. 221, 235-36 (1963) (congressional intent to support NLRB findings); Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477-78 (1951) (NLRA provided NLRB's findings based on
substantial evidence to be conclusive); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197
(1941) (Court deferred to NLRB's findings of fact).
75. See NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 789-90 (1979).
76. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 501 (1978) (NLRB given preference
in interpreting NLRA); see also NLRB v. Local 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural &

Ornamental Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 350 (1978) (deference allowed to NLRB in labor
matters); NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975) (NLRB interpretation of

policy matters weighed heavily).
77. See NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 789-90 n.16 (1979). This warning
resulted from the increasingly complex nature of hospital facilities. See id at 789 n.16; see

also Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 504 n.24 (1978) (presumptions should adequately consider complexity of hospital setting).
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Baptist Hospital is that solicitation is allowed, absent a showing of disruption to patient care in cafeterias and coffee shops but is not allowed in
patients' rooms, operating rooms, and other treatment rooms.7 In areas
where patients have access, like corridors and waiting rooms, the Supreme
Court will likely consider the statistical data involving frequency of patient
visitation as determinative in deciding whether to strike down or uphold
particular health care no-solicitation rules.7 9
B.

Working Hours

During the 1940's, the NLRB developed a set of presumptions relating
to the validity of industrial no-solicitation rules prohibiting solicitation
during working hours or working time.8 ° An employer's right to promulgate such rules was founded upon the NLRB's reasoning announced in
Peyton Packing: "Working time is for work. It is therefore within the
province of an employer to promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting
union solicitation during working hours. Such a rule must be presumed to
be valid . . .,,"
As early as 1973, this presumption was applied to health care industry
cases.8 2 The application of this presumption, however, typically reflects the
oscillating approach taken by the NLRB regarding union solicitation matters.8 3 For example, in Avon Convalescent Center, Inc.,8 4 the NLRB held,
in a pre-1974 decision, that use of the term "working time" in a no-solicitation rule was ambiguous and therefore invalid.85
In the first NLRB decision following the passage of the 1974 Health

78. See NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 781 n.ll (1979); Beth Israel Hosp. v.
NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 495 (1978).
79. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 502 (1978) (lack of patient use of
cafeteria of "critical significance").
80. See In re Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843-44 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d
1009 (5th Cir. 1944).
81. Id at 843.
82. See Avon Convalescent Center, Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. 702, 704-05 (1972), enforced, 490
F.2d 1384 (6th Cir. 1974) (NLRB rejected distinction between working time and working
hours holding no-solicitation rule overly broad and ambiguous).
83. Compare Guyan Valley Hosp., Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. 107, 112 (1972) (no-solicitation
rule banning union solicitation in working areas held valid) with Summit Nursing & Convalescent Home, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 769, 770 (1972), rev'd, NLRB v. Summit Nursing & Convalescent Home, Inc., 472 F.2d 1380 (6th Cir. 1973) (absent special circumstances nosolicitation rule prohibiting solicitation in work areas held invalid).
84. 200 N.L.R.B. 702 (1972), enforced, 490 F.2d 1384 (6th Cir. 1974).
85. See id at 704-05. The NLRB stated that while " '[w]orking time' by itself may be a
term of art for labor relations lawyers and experts, .... it is scarcely to be expected that
employees will readily understand the meaning of the phrase .
I..."
ld
at 705.
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Care Amendments, Essex International,Inc. ,86 the NLRB held in reversing Avon Convalescent Center, Inc. that a no-solicitation rule prohibiting
solicitation during "working time" was presumptively valid whereas a rule
forbidding solicitation during "working hours" was considered invalid.87
The NLRB's rationale behind distinguishing these two phrases was that
"working time" signified time spent in performing job related duties.88
"Working hours" could be interpreted by employees to mean that no solicitation was permitted from the hour they arrived on the job until the hour
they left the jobsite.89
In 1981, the NLRB majority, partly comprised of the two dissenters of
Essex, Members Fanning and Jenkins, and now joined by new Member
Zimmerman, found an industrial case, TA W Bearings Division, Division
of TR.W, 9 0 to be the judicial vehicle for reversing Essex.9 In TA. W, the
employer had in effect two separate no-solicitation rules, one forbidding
soliciting during working hours and the other prohibiting soliciting during
working time.92 The Administrative Law Judge decided that both rules as
applied were invalid.93 The NLRB, in affirming the Administrative Law

Judge's ruling, held that there existed no meaningful distinction between
86. 211 N.L.R.B. 749 (1974). In Essex Int'l, Inc. (Essex), dissenting Members Fanning
and Jenkins would adhere to the previous holding of Avon. See id at 753 (Fanning and
Jenkins dissenting).
87. See id. at 750. Working time would not include time spent for lunch and break
periods; hence, if an employee wishes to solicit when he is not performing job-related duties,
he would be free to do so in non-work areas. See id at 750. Working hours, as the NLRB
noted, could be understood to mean that solicitation would not be allowed to occur from the
time an employee "clock[ed] in" to the time he "clock[ed] out." See id at 750.
88. See id at 750.
89. See id at 750. "Working hours," when placed in a no-solicitation rule, was 'rima
facie susceptible" of misinterpretation that all solicitation was banned. See id at 750. The
NLRB required specific evidence proving that solicitation during lunch breaks, etc., was
communicated to employees. See id at 750. See generally Note, Reversal of NLRB Policy
Regarding No-Solicitation Rules, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 143, 150-52 (1982) (general discussion
of working time and working hours in no-solicitation rules).
90. 257 N.L.R.B. 442 (1981).
91. See id at 442-43, 443 n.7.
92. See id at 442-43. Before March of 1979, the employer had a rule prohibiting all
employees from engaging in solicitation during working time, a rule presumptively valid
according to Essex. See Essex Int'l, Inc., 211 N.L.R.B. 749, 750 (1974). Beginning in March
of 1979, the employer implemented a second rule forbidding solicitation during working
hours, which was presumptively invalid under Essex. See T.R.W. Bearings Div., Div. of
T.R.W., Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 442, 442 (1981).
93. See T.R.W. Bearings Div., Div. of T.R.W., Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 442, 442 (1981). The
Administrative Law Judge in TR. W Bearings Div., Div. of TR. W (TR. W.), was not persuaded by specific evidence that the prohibition against solicitation during "working hours"
had been communicated to the employees in such a way as to convince the employees that
solicitation was permissible during lunch and break times. See id at 442-43.
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working hours and working time. 94 Use of such ambiguous terms, the

Board concluded, effectively restricted an employee's self-organizational
rights guaranteed under the NLRA.9 5 Therefore, an existing no-solicitation rule drafted to comply with Essex was now presumptively invalid.96
In 1982, the NLRB repeatedly reiterated the standard announced in
TR.W in several health care cases. 97 By the close of 1982, however, proTR.W Member Fanning9 8 and Pro-Essex Presiding Chairman Van de
Water99 had departed from the NLRB."° With the appointment of acting

94. See id at 443; see also Essex, Int'l, Inc., 211 N.L.R.B. 749, 753 (1974) (Fanning and
Jenkins dissenting) (the terms "working time" and "working hours" ambiguous); Avon Convalescent Center, Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. 702, 704-05 (1972) (no distinction between working
time and working hours), enforced, 490 F.2d 1384 (6th Cir. 1974).
95. See T.R.W. Bearings Div., Div. of T.R.W., Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 442, 442-43 (1981).
Section 7 of the NLRA guarantees employees the right to organize unions. See National
Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1976)).
96. See T.R.W. Bearings Div., Div. of T.R.W., Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 442, 442 (1981). Essex decisions holding no-solicitation rules valid which contain the phrase "working time"
are presumptively invalid and were overruled. See id at 443 n.7.
97. See, e.g., Lutheran Homes, Div. of Lutheran Homes, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. No. 74, 111
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1654, 1655 (1982) (verbal solicitation rule banning solicitation during
working hours violative of NLRA); St. Joseph's Hosp., 263 N.L.R.B. No. 50, 111 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1053, 1053 (1982) (no-solicitation rule containing phrase "working time" held invalid); Intermedics, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 178, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1441, 1441 (1982) (ban
on solicitation during working time ruled invalid). In Intermedics, presiding Chairman Van
de Water and Member Hunter subscribed to the Essex standard that "working time" connotes time devoted to actual job performance and therefore would hold valid a rule prohibiting solicitation during working hours. See Intermedics, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 178, 110
L.R.R.M. 1441, 1442-43 (1982). Their reasoning is based on the labor law maxim from In re
Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1944),
that "[w]orking time is for work." See Intermedics, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 178, 110
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1441, 1442 n.7 (1982).
98. See T.R.W. Bearings Div., Div. of T.R.W., Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 442 (1981). Chairman Fanning was listed as part of the majority in the unofficial reporter. See T.R.W. Bearings Div., Div. of T.R.W., Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 47, 107 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1481, 1481
(1981).
99. See Intermedics, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 178, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1441, 1442-43
(1982) (Chairman Van de Water, concurring and dissenting); see also St. Joseph's Hosp., 263
N.L.R.B. No. 50, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1053, 1053 (1982) (Van de Water would not rely on
TR. W.); Woodview Rehabilitation Center, 265 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 5 LAB. L. REP. (CCH)
15,580, at 26,608-09 (Dec. 13, 1982) (Member Hunter would also rely on Essex). On June 18,
1981, Chairman Van de Water was appointed by President Reagan to be a member of the
NLRB for the remainder of resigning Member Penello's term. On August 13, 1981, Member
Van de Water was granted a recess appointment by the President designating him to be
Chairman of the NLRB. See 33 LAB. L.J. (inside front cover Oct. 1982) (discussion of Van
de Water's qualifications).
100. See Walther, Suggestions and Comments on the Future Direction of the NLRB, 34
LAB. L.J. 215, 226 (1983); see also Labor Management Relations, 33 LAB. L.J. 64, 64 (1982)
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Chairman Miller and Member Hunter, present opinion temporarily indicates a swing back towards the Essex standards, which does not require
working time to be defined in a no-solicitation rule.10
In Medical Center of Beaver County, Inc. ,"02 the Administrative Law
Judge held that the hospital employer violated section 8(a)(1) of the
NLRA by maintaining the following no-solicitation dress code:
"[H]ospital policy does not permit the use or wearing of. . .while on duty,
buttons, hats. . . or unauthorized insignia which may represent any political, economic or labor organization."' 3 Because this rule did not contain
a definitive statement that it did not apply in non-immediate patient care
areas and that it did not apply to employees on their lunch, rest, or other
uncompensated periods, the Administrative Law Judge decided the rule
was overly broad and discriminatory." °4 Acting Chairman Miller and
Member Hunter, joining the majority opinion, subscribed to the Essex decision but held the rule invalid on other grounds. 0 5 Member Jenkins relied on TR. W. and Member Zimmerman did not participate in the
decision. "
Presently, the NLRB adheres to TR.W. 07 Until the swing opinions of
new Chairman Dotson and proposed Member Dennis are heard, practitioners must continue to define and distinguish working time from non(Van de Water's nomination as Chairman fails before Senate Labor and Human Resources
Committee).
101. See Medical Center of Beaver County, Inc., 266 N.L.R.B. No. 85, 5 LAB. L. REP.
(CCH) 15,645, at 26,708-09 (Mar. 7, 1983) (acting Chairman Miller and Member Hunter
do not rely on TR.W); Quartrol Corp., 266 N.L.R.B. No. 14, 5 LAB. L. REP. (CCH)
15,634, at 26,693-94 (Feb. 10, 1983) (Hunter, dissenting) (Hunter supportive of Essex decision). Members Zimmerman and Jenkins subscribe to the TA. W decision. See Intermedics,
Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 178, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1441, 1441 (1982).
102. 266 N.L.R.B. No. 85, 5 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 15,645, at 26,708 (Mar. 7, 1983).
103. Id at 26,709 (emphasis added).
104. See id at 26,709.
105. See id at 26,709. The no-solicitation rule was invalid, they reasoned, because the
rule does not apply to only patient care areas. See id at 26,709; see generally Intermedics,
Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 178, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1441, 1442 (1982) (concurring and dissenting opinion of Chairman Van de Water and Hunter; Van de Water and Hunter approve of
Essex).
106. See Medical Center of Beaver County, Inc., 266 N.L.R.B. No. 85, 5 LAB. L. REP.
(CCH) 115,645, at 26,708-09 (Mar. 7, 1983). Member Jenkins joined the majority opinion.
See id at 26,708-09.
107. See Olympia Plastics Corp., 266 N.L.R.B. No. 96, 5 LAB. L. REP.(CCH) T 15,674,
at 26,745 (Mar. 22, 1983) (rules prohibiting solicitation "after working hours" unlawful); see
also Lincoln Hills Nursing Home, Inc., 266 N.L.R.B. No. 140, 5 LAB. L. REP. (CCH)
15,718, at 26,805-06 (May 10, 1983) (hospital's no-solicitation rule invalid and applied discriminatorily). In Lincoln Hills, employees were allowed to solicit sales of home decorations,
cosmetics, and Girl Scout cookies, even though the written no-solicitation rule forbade solicitation in work areas during working time. See id at 26,806.
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working time.

IV.

A FIFTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS: WORKING AREAS AND WORKING
HOURS-UNCHARTED GROUND

The Fifth Circuit has, in at least three cases, addressed the issue of nosolicitation rules in the health care industry. 0 9 In a recent case of first
impression, Dallas Association of Community Organizationsfor Reform
Now v. Dallas County Hospital District,"' the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court's finding that public hospitals may impose reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions on first amendment activities, including solicitation."' Due to the large number of indigent patients admitted to
Parkland Memorial Hospital," 2 the hospital promulgated a no-solicitation
rule banning any soliciting in all areas without prior approval from the
hospital administrator." 3 In this case, solicitation was not attempted by a
union but rather involved a group dissatisfied with the patient care at
Parkland." 4 The district court decided that a public hospital was not a
108. See Walther, Suggestions and Comments on the Future Direction of the NLRB, 34
L.J. 215, 227 (1983). On March 8, 1983, Chairman Dotson was confirmed by the Senate
for a five year term beginning December 16, 1983. See id. at 227 n.16. Patricia Dennis, not
yet confirmed, would be the second woman NLRB member. See id. at 227. It is also possible
that Member Jenkins may not be re-appointed by the Reagan administration in August,
1983. See Wall St. J., August 2, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
109. See Dallas Ass'n of Community Orgs. for Reform Now v. Dallas County Hosp.
Dist., 656 F.2d 1175, 1180 (5th Cir. 1981) (no solicitation permitted on first amendment
grounds), affd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 670 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1982); Vicksburg
Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 1070, 1079-80 (5th Cir. 1981) (court did not rule on nosolicitation rule); NLRB v. Florida Medical Center, Inc., 576 F.2d 666, 670 (5th Cir. 1978)
(use of term "hospital time" in rule overly ambiguous).
110. 656 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 670 F.2d
629 (5th Cir. 1982).
111. Seeid at 1179.
112. See Dallas Ass'n of Community Orgs. for Reform Now v. Dallas County Hosp.
Dist., 478 F. Supp. 1250, 1253 (N.D. Tex. 1979), aft'd, 656 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1981), aft'din
part, rev'd and remanded in part, 670 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1982). Parkland Memorial Hospital
in Dallas, Texas is owned by Dallas County Hospital District. See id at 1253. In 1978, the
outpatient clinic, the area where solicitation was desired, averaged approximately 900 patients per day in a facility built for 400. See id at 1253 n.3. Fewer than one-tenth of the
outpatients paid for services rendered. See id at 1253 n.4.
113. See id at 1254. The hospital no-solicitation rule read as follows: "[F]or the protection of our employees and patients, solicitation of any kind on hospital premises is prohibited without prior written approval of the Hospital Administrator." Id at 1254.
114. See id at 1253-54. The Dallas Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) was a group interested in improving defective health care conditions.
See id at 1253-54. Their complaints included, inter aia."need for neighborhood clinics;
improved waiting room conditions; and reduced waiting room time. See id. at 1254.
LAB.
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"public forum""' for first amendment speech," 6 and held that the primary purpose of the hospital was to provide health
care in an environment
"sheltered from outside noise and activities."'' 7
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit followed the lower court's reasoning and
ruled that a public hospital was unlike those public forums traditionally
recognized as open forums for free public assembly and communication,118 such as streets and parks," 9 schools,' 2 0 and state capitol
grounds.' 2 ' The Fifth Circuit, moreover, found that in performing public
functions, hospitals were similar to jails 22 and reasonable time, place, and

115. See id. at 1257. The public forum concept essentially included those places in the
community which were historically places for public speech. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S.
828, 838 (1976) (purpose of military institution to prepare soldiers, not to be a public forum);
Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (streets and parks hold right
of communication in trust for public). The second public forum test is whether such places
presently are appropriate for normal "forum" activities. See Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-04 (1974) (no freedom of speech violation in denial of advertising
space to political candidate); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 117-21 (1972)
(school property not proper forum for picketing activity). For a discussion of the public
forum concept, see generally Homing, The First Amendment Right to a Public Forum, 1969
DUKE L.J. 931.
116. See Dallas Ass'n of Community Orgs. for Reform Now v. Dallas County Hosp.
Dist., 478 F. Supp. 1250, 1257 (N.D. Tex. 1979), afl'd, 656 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1981), aft'din
part,rev'd and remanded inpart, 670 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1982). The lower court, furthermore,
found no factual evidence supporting the proposition that a hospital is a public forum. See
id. at 1257-58.
117. See id at 1257-58. The forum did not gain constitutional protection merely because the outpatient area was the most appropriate place for their activity. See id at 1258.
Moreover, the lower court likened patients to the "captive audience" protected by the
Supreme Court. Compare id at 1258 (hospital patients "captive" to hospital solicitation)
with Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974) (bus riders "captive audience" to visual advertising) (quoting Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468
(1952)).
118. See Dallas Ass'n of Community Orgs. for Reform Now v. Dallas County Hosp.
Dist., 656 F.2d 1175, 1179-80 (5th Cir. 1981), affd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 670
F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1982).
119. See, e.g., Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197, 198-99 (1972) (public street has
first amendment protection); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) (streets retain degree of free speech protection); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515
(1939) (parks traditional repositories for free speech).
120. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 117 (1972) (free speech rights
allowed as important part of educational process); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (absent disruption of schools' work, free speech
allowed).
121. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 230, 235 (1963) (peaceful assembly
on state capitol grounds permissible).
122. See Dallas Ass'n of Community Orgs. for Reform Now v. Dallas County Hosp.
Dist., 656 F.2d 1175, 1180 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 670 F.2d
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manner restrictions on first amendment activities could be imposed.' 2 3
Thus, a "reasonable restrictions on solicitation" argument is feasible and
could be used to rebut presumably invalid solicitation rules by gathering
24
substantial evidence showing an interruption of service to the patient,
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit factually distinguished the instant case
from Baptist Hospital because of the substantial evidence showing the congested nature of the hospital. 2 5 In its decision, the court of appeals implicitly placed great weight on the congressional intent to provide patients
with undisturbed patient care.' 26 The Fifth Circuit, however, refused to
consider the constitutionality of the no-solicitation rule.' 27 Solicitation, the
court held, could be restricted because certain "sensitive" patient care areas within the hospital transcend the no-solicitation rule.' 28
In the most recent Fifth Circuit case, MarathonLeTourneau Co., Longview Division v. NLRB, 129 the court of appeals invalidated an unwritten
industrial no-solicitation rule prohibiting solicitation during working
hours.' 3 0 In February of 1978, an employee was verbally reprimanded for
629 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966) (jail grounds not
protected area for free speech).
123. See Dallas Ass'n of Community Orgs. for Reform Now v. Dallas County Hosp.
Dist., 656 F.2d 1175, 1178 (5th Cir. 1981), aftd inpart, rev'd and remanded inpart, 670 F.2d
629 (5th Cir. 1982); see also United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic
Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 132-33 (1981) (letter box not public forum therefore subject to time,
place, and manner restrictions); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530, 536-37 (1980) (restriction of political mail inserts subject to time, place, and manner
restrictions but not based on content). But see Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94 (1977) (content of signs not subject to time, place, and manner
restrictions).
124. See Dallas Ass'n of Community Orgs. for Reform Now v. Dallas County Hosp.
Dist., 656 F.2d 1175, 1180 (5th Cir. 1981), ar7d inpart, rev'd and remanded in part, 670 F.2d
629 (5th Cir. 1982).
125. See id at 1180. Due to the handling of over 900 patients per day, employees were
instructed not to use the inpatient entrance. See id.at 1180.
126. See id at 1180-81. Without citing the legislative intent to give uninterrupted patient care, the Fifth Circuit concluded: "[W]e merely wish to enable those who need health
care at Parkland to receive it without interference and without the grave possibilities of
adverse medical reactions from such disturbing conditions." Id at 1180.
127. See id at 1181. Parenthetically, the court determined that the no-solicitation rule
was clear, not vague or overbroad. See id at 1181 n. 15.
128. See id at 1181. The court expressly limited its holding to the facts in the instant
case. See id at 1181.
129. 699 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1983).
130. See id at 256-57. Based on the substantial evidence found by the Administrative
Law Judge, the Fifth Circuit was obligated to uphold the NLRB's decision. See id at 256.
For an additional discussion of substantial evidence, see Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437
U.S. 483, 507 (1978) (limited court review of NLRB decisions); Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (definition of substantial evidence); 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)
(1976) (NLRB findings conclusive where supported by record as a whole). The NLRB, in
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posting pro-union handbills before "clocking in" on the job.'3 During the
same period, a pro-company employee was not reprimanded for distributing, in the presence of his supervisor, anti-union literature during "working hours."' 3 2 The NLRB concluded, among other things, 33 that such
actions resulted
from an anti-union animus in violation of section 8 of the
34
NLRA.'
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the NLRB's ruling. 3' 5 A no-solicireasoned, may be promulgated and enforced during
tation rule, the court
"working hours,"' 36 but such rules must be reasonably connected to an
employer's interest in productivity and must not be discriminatorily applied. 137 On a review of the record, the Fifth Circuit determined that allowing a pro-company employee to distribute literature while denying the
same privilege to a pro-union employee constituted essentially selective,
and thereby discriminatory, enforcement. 13 Even in the absence of selective enforcement, it is well-settled labor policy that production or discibe advanced before solicitation can be forbidden after
pline reasons must
139
working hours.
TR. W, presumed invalid any no-solicitation rule containing the term "working hours." See
T.R.W. Bearing Div., Div. of T.R.W., Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 442, 442 (1981); see also Lutheran
Homes, Div. of Lutheran Homes, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. No. 74, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1654,
1655 (1982) (application of TR. W rule in health care setting); Tressler Lutheran Home for
Children, 263 N.L.R.B. No. 42, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1591, 1591 (1982) (discussion of
TR. W holding by NLRB in health care case).
131. See Marathon LeTourneau Co., Longview Div. v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 248, 255-56
(5th Cir. 1983).
132. See id at 256.
133. See id at 255. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the NLRB's finding that denying overtime assignments to an employee on account of solicitation activity may be an unfair labor
practice. See id at 255-56; see also NLRB v. Buddy Schoellkopf Prods., Inc., 410 F.2d 82, 87
(5th Cir. 1969) (unfair labor practice to deny overtime because of union activity).
134. See National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 8, 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976)). This section states that: "[I]t shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer. . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
135. See Marathon LeTourneau Co., Longview Div. v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 248, 256 (5th
Cir. 1983).
136. See id at 255-56.
137. See id at 256; see also NLRB v. Turner Tool & Joint Rebuilders Corp., 670 F.2d
637, 641 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Essex Int'l, Inc., 211 N.L.R.B. 749 (1974); employer solicitation rules must be non-discriminatorily applied); NLRB v. Roney Plaza Apartments, 597
F.2d 1046, 1050 (5th Cir. 1979) (barring solicitation after working hours requires production
or discipline reasons); NLRB v. Mangurians's, Inc., 566 F.2d 463, 465 (5th Cir. 1978) (employee has right to distribute literature after working hours absent special circumstances).
138. See Marathon LeTourneau Co., Longview Div. v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 248, 256 (5th
Cir. 1983).
139. See id at 256; see also NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956).
This landmark decision held that "[n]o restriction may be placed on the employees' right to

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol15/iss1/4

22

Kennady: Union Solicitation in the Health Care Industry: Guidelines for th

19831

COMMENT

More importantly, the Marathon LeTourneau appeals court declined to
rely on the NLRB's TR. W decision.' 40 In its final analysis, the Fifth Circuit did not define "working hours" in stating that "LeTourneau was entitled to promulgate and enforce reasonable rules controlling distribution
and solicitation by its employees during working hours."'4 ' The implication was that the Fifth Circuit did not concern itself with semantic differthat
ences between working hours and working time, a distinction
42
continues to be a source of controversy in NLRB rulings. 1
In this uncertain area, practitioners representing health care institutions
can avoid needless litigation by adopting concrete, specific no-solicitation
rules. Part V of this comment contains guidelines reflecting a conservative
approach designed to assure complete compliance with the rulings of
United States Supreme Court and the NLRB.
discuss self-organization among themselves, unless the employer can demonstrate that a restriction is necessary to maintain production or discipline." Id at 113; see also NLRB v.
Mid-States Metal Prods., Inc., 403 F.2d 702, 704 (5th Cir. 1968) (production or discipline
reasons necessitate strict no-solicitation rule); NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 289 F.2d 177, 180
(5th Cir. 1961) (no-solicitation rule promulgated for production, order, or discipline reasons
may not violate NLRA).
140. See Marathon LeTourneau Co., Longview Div. v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 248, 255-56
(5th Cir. 1983).
141. Id at 255 (emphasis added). The opinion contained no discussion of TR. W.
where the NLRB found unlawful ambiguity in the use of the term "working hours" in a nosolicitation rule. See id at 255; T.R.W. Bearing Div., Div. of T.R.W., Inc., 257 N.L.R.B.
442, 443 (1981). "Working hour" when used in a no-solicitation rule is presumed invalid by
the NLRB. See id. at 443.
142. See generaly Medical Center of Beaver County, Inc., 266 N.L.R.B. No. 85, 5 LAB.
L. REP. (CCH) 15,645, at 26,708-09 (Mar. 7, 1983) (Member Jenkins agrees with fact that
ambiguity exists between working hours and working time). This distinction eludes Members Hunter and acting Chairman Miller. See Intermedics, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 178, 110
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1441, 1442 (1982) (concurring and dissenting opinion of Chairman Van de
Water and Member Hunter). Although their opinion agreed with the majority that an unfair
labor practice charge had occurred, they subscribed to the standard enunciated in Essex,
which stated that a valid distinction existed between working time and working hours. See
id at 1442. The NLRB displays a disparate approach regarding solicitation matters. Compare Hammary Mfg. Corp., Div. of U.S. Indus., 265 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1346, 1347 (1982) (exception for United Way solicitation valid while union solicitation denied), amending 258 N.L.R.B. 1319, 1320 (1981) with St. Vincent's Hosp., 265 N.L.R.B. No.
6, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1346, 1349, 1350 (1982) (exception for flower fund solicitation invalid). In the opinion of the NLRB, flower fund drives apparently lack the status of
"beneficient acts," a status granted to the United Way fund-raising. See Hammary Mfg.
Corp., Div. of U.S. Indus., 265 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1346, 1347 n.4 (1982),
amending 258 N.L.R.B. 1319, 1320 (1981).
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PRACTICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE PRACTITIONER IN
DRAFTING NO-SOLICITATION RULES

A.

ProposedNo-Solicitation Rule

The no-solicitation rule recommended below is facially valid and nondiscriminatory but should be read in light of the subsequent discussion:
No employee shall solicit or distribute any materials for any reasons when performing tasks, duties, or other functions for which the
employee is being paid by the employer. Such paid time is working
time, which does not include lunch, break periods, or other times
when an employee is not being paid.' 4 3
Solicitation or distribution shall not be permitted at any time by
any employee or non-employee in the following immediate patient
care areas: patients' rooms, operating rooms, therapy rooms, and any
other patient treatment rooms.'44
Due to the significantly harmful effect on patient care, this health
care facility also prohibits solicitation or distribution in recovery
stairways that are prirooms, intensive care units, and elevators and
45
marily used for the movement of patients.
46
Solicitation or distribution to non-employees is forbidden. ,
This rule is necessarily detailed; almost all no-solicitation rules that are
sweepingly stated are invalidated as overly broad by the NLRB and the
143. See In re Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943) (no-solicitation rule
enforceable during working time), aft'd, 145 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1944); see also T.R.W. Bearings Div., Div. of T.R.W., Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 442, 443 (1981) (definition of working time in
rule necessary to remove ambiguity). Even if the two new NLRB members reaffirm Essex,
this rule will still be valid since it complies with the stricter standards of TR. W. which
require working hours to be defined. Compare T.R.W. Bearings Div., Div. of T.R.W., Inc.,
257 N.L.R.B. 442, 443 (1981) (no distinction between working time and working hours) with
Essex Int'l, Inc., 211 N.L.R.B. 749, 750-51 (1974) (valid difference between terms working
time and working hours).
144. See NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 781 n.10 (1979) (citing St. John's
Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 1150, 1150 (1976) (definition of immediate
patient care areas), enforced in part and denied in part, 557 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1977).
145. See NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., 442 U.S. 773, 789-90 n.16 (1979). The Supreme Court
has expressed great dissatisfaction with the limited definition of patient care areas, and has
inferred quite strongly that judicial intervention may become necessary in the future. See id.
at 789. This above proposed no-solicitation rule represents a partial expansion of the immediate patient care area definition that in all likelihood would be embraced by the United
States Supreme Court. See id at 789.
146. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 503-04 n.23 (1978). This final portion of the suggested rule would prevent possibly agitating union material from being read
by patients. See id at 503 n.23. This could be accomplished by requiring all employees to
wear name tags. See id at 503-04 n.23.
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Thus, any health care facility using the above rule adopts a conservative approach designed to inform employees when and where solicitation is not allowed.1 4 8 Labor law practitioners, however, must consider the
suggested rule as only one part of the overall
49 strategy when advising clients
in this sensitive and controversial area.'
courts.

14 7

B. Additional Considerationsfora Labor Law Practitioner
A labor law attorney should also be aware of three ways in which a nosolicitation rule may be reinforced.' 5 °
1. Burden of Proof
First, a practitioner should know that the hospital has to carry the burden of proof."'5 Thus, a health care facility wishing to prohibit solicitation
outside of immediate patient care areas has the burden to show that solici52
tation in the proscribed areas is likely to disrupt or disturb patient care.'
Consequently, a hospital meets its burden of proof when presenting evidence proving a potential or actual disruption of patient care. 53 Where
this burden is not met, the risk of non-persuasion falls directly on the hospital, causing the hospital's no-solicitation rule to fail.' ' 4 If the hospital
147. See Quartrol Corp., 266 N.L.R.B. No. 14, 5 LAB. L. REP. (CCH)
15,634, at
26,693-95 (Feb. 10, 1983) (overly broad no-solicitation rule failed to meet TR. W standard);
see also NLRB v. Florida Medical Center, Inc., 576 F.2d 666, 670-71 (5th Cir. 1978) (lack of
definition of non-working time in rule determined invalid as overly broad); Lutheran
Homes, Div. of Lutheran Homes, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. No. 74, 111 L.R.R.M, (BNA) 1654,
1654-55 (1982) (use of phrase "during working time" ambiguously invalid); Intermedics,
Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 178, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1441, 1441 (1982) (rule prohibiting solicitation "on working time" held presumptively invalid).
148. See generally NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 775 n.I, 776 n.2 (1979).
The suggested no-solicitation rule relies for its support on the Baptist Hospital,Beth Israel,
and TR. W decisions. See NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 785-86, 789 n.16
(1979); Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 503-04 n.23 (1978); T.R.W. Bearings Div.,
Div. of T.R.W., Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 442, 443 (1981).
149. See NLRB v, Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 779, 782-83 (1979) (sufficiency of
evidence, burden of proof, and legislative intent important factors in Supreme Court
rulings).
150. See id at 779, 782.
151. See id at 781. The Supreme Court explicitly placed the burden of proof on the
hospital. See id at 781.
152. See id at 781.
153. See id at 781 n. 11. Additionally, the Court noted that great deference should be
given to the need for uninterrupted patient care. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S.
483, 498-500 (1978).
154. Cf. NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 781-82 (1979) (hospital failed to
meet burden); Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 502 (1978) (hospital failed to carry
burden of proof); see also Woodview Rehabilitation Center, 265 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 5 LAB. L.
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meets the burden of proof by presenting substantial evidence, then the
union must prove that no harmful effects are occurring to patients subject
to union organizational activity in patient-frequented areas.155
2. Substantial Evidence and Statistical Data
Once the hospital submits evidence to the NLRB supporting the hospital's no-solicitation rule, the NLRB makes findings of fact that are binding
on appellate courts except where such findings are not supported by" 'substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole'."' 5 6 Substantial evidence has been defined as "more than a mere scintilla" and connotes such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.157 As a practical matter, the Supreme Court emphasizes
that statistical data presented by the hospital indicating frequent use by
patients in the controverted area will have considerable evidentiary value
in these sensitive health care cases.' 58
3. Trend Towards Uninterrupted Patient Care
The Court's deliberation of these issues also reveals an enlightened sensitivity to the unique nature of the health care institutions.' 59 A practiREP. (CCH) 1 15,580, at 26,608 (Dec. 13, 1982) (employer failed to prove necessity of no-

solicitation rule due to production, discipline, or safety reasons).
155. Cf. NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 785-86 (1979) (absent. rebutting
evidence hospital's evidence found sufficient to meet burden of proof).
156. See id. at 782 (hospital failed to submit enough evidentiary support to justify nosolicitation rule in cafeteria); cf. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 502 (1978) (evidence proving extensive patient use found lacking); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474, 491 (1951) (Supreme Court accords deference to NLRB findings); Baylor Univ.
Medical Center v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 351, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (evidence presented by hospital sufficient to justify broad prohibition on solicitation).
157. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (definition of
substantial evidence); see also St. John's Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d
1368, 1378 (10th Cir. 1977) (NLRB's findings of fact accepted as supported by substantial
evidence). Statutory authority supports the proposition that the NLRB's findings of fact are
to be given considerable weight by appellate courts. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f) (1976).
158. See NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 781-82 (1979) (citing Beth Israel
Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 503 (1978); importance of patient frequency use expressly
stated by Supreme Court). Significantly, in Beth Israel, the Supreme Court mentioned the
statistical infrequency of patient use in a sensitive area at two different points in its opinion.
See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 490, 502 (1978).
159. See NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 791 (1979) (Burger, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger's opinion represents part of a trend which is sympathetic to the
purposes and needs of the hospital, as expressed in Baptist Hospital: "I would think no
'evidence' is needed to establish the proposition that the primary mission of every hospital is
care and concern for the patients and that anything which tends to interfere with that objective cannot be tolerated . . . . The hospital's only purpose is the care ... of its patients
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tioner should additionally appreciate the congressional intent behind the
60
Health Care Amendments to accord special consideration to the patient. 1
The Supreme Court has recognized this intent and has repeatedly emphasized that the primary function of a hospital is to provide efficient patient
care.' 6 1 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, concluded in Beth Israel
Hospital that:
[T]he Board [bears] a heavy continuing responsibility to review its
policies concerning organizational activities in various parts of hospitals. Hospitals carry on a public function of the utmost seriousness
and importance. They give rise to unique considerations that do not
apply in the industrial settings with which the Board is more familiar.
The Board should stand ready to revise its ruling if future experience
62
demonstrates that the well-being of patients is in fact jeopardized.
Justice Brennan's concern for patients was subsequently reaffirmed in
the Baptist Hospital'6 3 decision and moreover suggests to the practitioner a
trend favoring the patients recovery in a tranquil environment.64 In short,
the congressional intention expressed in the Health Care Amendments and
the judicial concern for uninterrupted patient care require all practitioners
to pay special
heed to this area in advising their clients in solicitation
65
matters. 1

....
Id at 791, 793 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice concluded by adding:
"whatever doubts there may be as to the adverse effects on patients should be resolved in
favor of their protection. I would not elevate the interests of unions or employees, whose
highest duty is to patients, to a higher plane than that of the patients." Id at 793 (Burger,
C.J., concurring).
160. See S. REP. No. 766, 93d CONG., 2d SEss. 2, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, 3946, 3948.
161. See NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 793 (1979)(Burger, C.J., concurring); see also Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 489, 513 (Powell, J., concurring).
162. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 489, 508 (1978) (quoting NLRB v. Beth
Israel Hosp., 554 F.2d 477, 481 (1st Cir. 1977)). Justice Brennan, moreover, took judicial
notice of the fact that the NLRB's guidelines are in an uncertain "flux," and concluded that
the NLRB did have authority to modify its guidelines in this area. See id at 508.
163. See NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 790 (1979) (citing Beth Israel
Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 508 (1978)).
164. See NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 791, 793, 796-97 (1979) (Burger,
C.J., concurring, and Brennan, J., concurring). Uninterrupted patient care is heavily emphasized by the present Justices. See id at 793, 795.
165. See id at 796-97 (Brennan, J., concurring). A practitioner might also argue that
the NLRB should use its statutory rule-making authority to promulgate a no-solicitation
rule. See generall, National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 6, 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1976)). Section 6 of the NLRA states: "The Board [NLRB]
shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind . . . such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act." See id § 156. There
is Supreme Court authority for the use of such rule-making power. See NLRB v. Bell Aero-
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CONCLUSION

Presently, the practitioner should be aware of some possible developments that could occur in the near future. The United States Supreme
Court has twice encouraged the National Labor Relations Board to expand their presumptions relating to immediate patient care areas in the
health care industry. 66 With the addition of two new NLRB members, the
National Labor Relations Board may soon follow judicial admonitions to
restructure its presumptions relating to solicitation in hospital patient care
areas. The no-solicitation rule offered in the previous section could be a
valid starting point since the rule is consistent with the leading Supreme
Court decisions in this area. A labor law practitioner in drafting a nosolicitation rule 67should be careful in balancing the rights of both patient
and employee. 1

As revealed by the legislative intent behind the Health Care Amendments, the first and primary concern is the patients' interest in recovering
in a peaceful and tranquil environment, uninterrupted by union activity.
An equally important interest, however, is the employees' right to self-organization as guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act. 168 As a
practical matter, the ultimate burden falls on the attorney representing the
hospital to prove that 4isruption to the patient has occurred. Future NLRB
holdings may be helpftl in deciding how much evidence is enough, but a
prudent attorney, for union or management, could substantially aid his
client by amassing statistical data showing frequency of patient use of a
particular "patient care" area. 169 The final analysis reveals that prompt
NLRB action is urgently needed to eliminate confusion and disagreement
regarding no-solicitation rules. Otherwise, it is entirely possible, even

space Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290 (1974) (NLRB not precluded from announcing new rules under
section 6 authority); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 763-64 (1969) (rule-making authority of section 6 suggested by Justice Fortas). See generally Bernstein, The NLRB's
Adudication--Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative ProcedureAct, 79 YALE L.J.
571, 589-93 (1970) (good discussion of rarely used statutory authority and Administrative
Procedure Act).
166. See generally NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 789-90 (1979); Beth Israel
Hosp. v. NLRB., 437 U.S. 483, 508 (1978).
167. See generally NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 791-93 (1979) (Burger,
C.J., concurring) (Chief Justice accords great weight to patient care); see also Fanning,
Union Solicitationand Distributionof Literatureon the Job-Balancingthe Rights of Employers and Employees, 9 GA. L. REV. 367, 371-73 (1975) (former Chairman Fanning expressed
concern over Supreme Court mandate to form new rule in solicitation areas).
168. See Fanning, Union Solicitation andDistributionof Literatureon the Job-Balancing the Rights of Employers and Employees, 9 GA. L. REV. 367, 367-68 (1975) (court must
balance interests).
169. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 502 (1978) (statistical data of "critical significance").
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151

probable, that the Supreme Court may exercise its judicial prerogative by
announcing guidelines accomodating both health care patients and health
care employees.
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